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Toutes les informations de la Bibliothèque Nationale de France sur: L'être et le néant - Jean-Paul Sartre (). of copyright is given. Table of Contents. Getting Started . .. 4. Sartre: Life and Works. L'être et le Néant: Essai D'ontologie Phénoménologique. Paris: Gallimard, and underlining. PDF Information: 70 pages – mb.


Letre Et Le Neant Pdf

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does not belong to the existentialist school, but the basic experience which permeates his thought is also at the root of Existentialism. The time is that of the. Jean-Paul Sartre: L'Être et le néant [Being and Nothingness] ( words). Roy Elveton (Carleton Download PDF Save to Bookshelf Tweet Report an Error. ecogenenergy.info Free Download Books Letre Et Le Neant Essai Dontologie Phenomenologique. Ebooks Download PDF Letre Et Le Neant .

According to the libertarian view, the admission of free will implies a refusal of determinism. While Sartre would agree that freedom implies such a refusal at least as regards subjective existence , he quite simply does not equate freedom with free will. In fact, for Sartre, freedom as an ontological concept is rather removed from the idea of free will.

Consciousness is free regardless of human will. Freedom is a transcendental condition for conscious being.

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That is not, for Sartre, the case with will. Will is witness, not agent 5The second consideration is related to the agential status of will. Yet again, Sartre disagrees with the more obvious representations. Besides, we know that as far a For the existentialist, action is determined subjectively, through and by the very living of consciousness. In reflection, consciousness merely witnesses reflected consciousness, becoming aware of choices lived in that reflected consciousness.

This collides with traditional perspectives on the powers of deliberation. But, more significantly, it also signals something of a Copernican revolution. Indeed, what Sartre proposes is to shift human reflection from a stance of agency to a stance of awareness. And this shift resonates significantly in another Copernican-like revolution down the line, from a distinct angle. The shadow of my sorrow! It is feelings, rather, that are the shadows of emotions, in that the former are a conscious perception of the latter.

Although emotional living is necessarily conscious for one but not for the other, both authors posit that emotional living has significant priority over reflective consciousness. Thus motives, while perceived within the realm of will, only appear in reference to a project which gives meaning to an action determined elsewhere rather than determining action directly from a reflective position, as deliberation would make us suppose.

It is this project — where motives are aspects of the world implied in the project — that is pictured in will, through reflection. Each motive is a certain objective structure of the world, dependent on a certain point of view, the point of view of a certain project towards which the world is mobilised. Sartre is very clear on this issue, stating that to the positional awareness of motives or reasons to act in reflection corresponds a non-thetic self-consciousness as mobile — a more or less passionate project towards an end.

Motives and mobiles are, in fact, correlative, and both refer to the ends of a project: mobiles as a non-thetic living of the motives. At the same time, mobiles only have meaning in relation to a world articulated through motives. The precedence is unequivocal: even objective motives precede their reflective appropriation into will. When mobiles need to be grasped in a transcendent way. According to Williams, reasons for acting are exclusively internal reasons, i.

But that does not necessarily mean that only internal reasons can be reasons for action. It is one thing to recognise that only internal reasons can determine action, but quite another to suppose that all relevant reasons must be internal.

And I would agree. But, even assuming that refusal of externalism, it is not clear that Williams could state that there are only internal reasons. But at the very same time, mobiles find correlation in motives, or reasons for action. A simple image is that subjective mobiles and objective motives are two sides of the same coin. Having one means having the other.

For both Sartre and Williams, though not the same, there is one criterion that must be satisfied in order to determine action. And we can consider such a criterion an internalist concept of determination of human action. But here a significant difference must be emphasised. Wants and desires can count as internal for Sartre — not because they belong to a subjective motivational set, but only insofar as they remain present, always contemporary to the present of consciousness.

Once they lose their place in the living present, they are neither lost for good, nor absolutely absent. Externality and internality are not defined based on having or not having a relation with desires and wants, but on their being or not being in the present living.

Employing words and concepts more familiar to Sartre, the criterion consists of transcending or not transcending consciousness. For him, it is crucial to be able to perform two phenomenological tasks: firstly, to recognise when the present of a consciousness is transcended; and, secondly, to identify the consequences that follow from that transcendence, both from the point of view of knowledge and from the point of view of determining action.

Here the philosopher exemplifies with a lived experience of displeasure or repulse directed towards someone. An experience that Sartre refuses to identify with, or even assume to be necessarily motivated by, a psychological state, such as a feeling of hate, or a psychological quality, such as being a spiteful person. For example, I can be aware of repulsion and anger towards Peter and, however, not be sure that I hate him. Indeed, adds Sartre, hatred is then a transcendent object that appears to me by the unreflected experience of disgust or repulsion Sartre, Psychological states — of which love and hate are examples — are objects that are transcendent to consciousness, revealing themselves both from an epistemic perspective, as fallible realities, and also from an existential perspective as inert realities, unable to make any determination in the life of consciousness.

Emotions and action 23The small revolution convened by Sartre would not be complete if it focused only on the movement of expelling psychological states and qualities from inner consciousness to transcendence.

It was also necessary to reveal the crucially active aspect of emotions, which are not doomed to passive condition of expression. According to Sartre, emotions introduce an element of modulation to the meanings of how worldly objects present themselves to consciousness, softening, bypassing, or adapting to adversity.

Sartre provides a very simple example of this plasticity: when perceiving that a bunch of grapes is not, after all, at hand, reachable, consciousness transforms its relationship with the world emotionally. The bunch of grapes becomes less attractive — now, it is just a bunch of unripe grapes. Another example: an emotion like joy is a foretaste of the fruition that the overcoming of distances and adversity will bring, and sadness translates an inhibited relationship to the world, thus inhibiting adversities that potentiate frustration.

This plastic modulation changes not so much the world in its objective adversity, but the way we live it. Teleologism of action, not of morals; Deontologism on ethics, but not Kantian 26Motives, mobiles, reasons, emotions, all considered, were all meaningless outside references to a project.

As the past has no power over the present, it excludes mental causation, as it excludes any other form of determinism over shifting consciousness. For instance, an unconscious drive of consciousness. This teleologism establishes a not-yet-existent future as value and as meaning of all motives and mobiles of action. On the contrary, there are several elements that point to a Sartrean deontological perspective.

But not as Kant conceptualises it. Not as a rule, an imperative, that should be obeyed by the will. Furthermore, I chose all of my moves and I chose to accept that my opponent won. Ultimately, the game is a result of the choices we have taken and the moves we have made.

I can either accept that I have lost as a result of these choices or I can try to make it an effect of externalities. That is, of either what he is, how the game is or what I am, thereby denying responsibility of my free consciousness. It might be better to think that it is somehow a mistake that I have lost.

If we just played another time, or another game or I played another person I would win. Bad faith is a rather common response to the world. It is applied as a strategy to avoid the responsibility of being free. But what separates the bad faith of hatred from the bad faith of e. Have I merely escaped my responsibility so that I can be satisfied with myself or have I created myself as having inviolable moral value so that everyone should deem me good at the expense of the Other.

A Subject who hates has chosen fixed essence rather than free existence. Sartre, 63 17 The aim of hateful subjects is to construct the world so that they are not free.

Rather, they want to be a part of a synthetic entity together with all that is good, just and righteous, whether that be the true french for the french anti-semite , the natural and proper sexuality for gay-haters , the one true religion for missionaries of crusades or the like. Hatred is a desire to exist in a fixed relation to Others, but a fixed relation of morality. Hatred as an attitude So far, we have dealt with the emotive content of hatred and through that it has become clear that hatred ultimately is an attitude to the relation between our consciousness and the idea about who we are.

Hatred is a passion and is recognized by us through its emotional content, but emotions are only the superstructure of this conflict of consciousness. Sartre, 18 We need the Other in order to be something rather than just existing as pure consciousness. But to be something is a very different thing from that of consciousness. I can never doubt that consciousness is consciousness for me. He chooses to acquire nothing, to deserve nothing [ And we know that this truth can be attained only in so far as my consciousness becomes as object for the Other at the same time as the Other becomes an object for my consciousness.

I do not need recognition from Others to ascertain that I really undergo the discomfort we call nausea. One might argue that it is not the feeling called nausea, but this argument does not infringe on the reality of the individual. But who is something, is an external phenomenon. We can disagree about who is e. Danish and we can discuss what it means to be Danish.

Such a discussion will change the reality of the individual, because it changes a truth about ourselves that seem to us as fundamental as consciousness itself. But it is a truth which is dependent on Others.

We have an attitude as the basis of our concrete relations to Others. The relation to Others on which our emotions are based, can fundamentally be shaped in two different ways. By imagining that we are something, by objectifying ourselves, by denying that we are free. This attitude can work to different extents, but ultimately it is a movement towards masochism. Love, as we shall see, is a first attitude. By imagining that the Other is something, by objectifying the Other, by denying the free will of the Other.

This attitude moves towards sadism. By the aid of these two forms of lying to ourselves, we enter into concrete relations with other people.

It is lying because it is two ways of trying to make an identity mine as much as my consciousness is. It should be clear by now that hatred is an attitude build upon the second attitude. I will begin by a short explanation of the problems of the first attitude.

This will help understand the contradictions of an attitude and it will also give an understanding to the negation of hatred - love. The first attitude. They work as two strategies of denial that the subject oscillates between. But this desire can only display itself through a free will, which is the being of an autonomous subject. In other words, love needs a free subject to be unfree. What the lover wants is an Other being that wants his love in a way that ensures that she will also want it tomorrow and the day after.

He wants the love not just to be a condition of the now; he wants it to be a transcendent state of being. But he wants it to be out of free will. He thinks that he can then become through the static will of the Other and thus stop the contradictions of consciousness.

This is his strategy to merge his consciousness with his identity. He is now something to an Other; an absolute value, which is greater than others systems of value. He needs an idea of external value to do this. It implies that the lover would not be satisfied with the value of love as a fidelity to oneself.

He needs the Other to give value to the concept of love, even if it is ultimately an attitude to his own self-perception. But when he is to-me, I need a third perspective to give me value. I need an idea of subjectivity that can give content to my attitude. If I act as if the will of a person is unimportant to what he is, it can construct meaning about me.

But only if there is someone to see that I meet a person with this attitude. This idea of a third perspective is morality. To hate something is, like love, a will that points towards itself. In order to be something, the subject has created an object of hate — an idea. Normally, we would think that hatred arises from external factors as a response to the world, but as we have seen, the emotions caused by hatred are a strategic response to change his own reality.

In the same way as with love, our need for someone to hate is primary to who we hate, because it is first of all a desire for another reality. The hater hates an idea. But he needs real persons in order to give the hatred content - in order for the hate not just to be about himself. It needs to go through Others. And when it refuses to accept the Other as an autonomous subject with a free will like himself, the subject needs an idea of another subjectivity that can establish my identity as being me and having value.

Just like a toothbrush cannot give me the value of being generous, an objectified Other cannot give value to my identity. Like the first attitude, the second attitude can vary very much in intensity. To create the Other as an object can, in its most subtle form, occur as an attitude of indifference. The moral aspect here is that such an attitude excludes the Other from the moral sphere.

The Hegelian Legacy in Kojève and Sartre

But the more a subject wishes to construct the Other as an object, the more aggressive strategy he will need to apply. The further we get to the other end of the spectrum of intensity, the further we get to the attitude of sadism.

I could try to prove that the Other is an object by clearly making him a means to my well-being and not an end in himself. I could beat him up only in order not to be bored or I could spit at him for the challenge of hitting him in the face. Hatred does not, though, always aim at presenting pleasure for the hater like sadism does. But it does aim at presenting a desirable reality for the hater. Joy is only one of the means to produce such a reality.

Hatred is a reaction to the humiliation brought upon us by the fact that the Other is free like ourselves or in other word, that he is not different from us. Hatred is a strategy to exclude something from the society categorically.

But what hatred really wants is to exclude is something and not someone. In other words, it needs to particularize an idea to real people. The hater makes individuals representative of this idea. To illustrate the transition from an idea to hate of particular persons and back into hatred of a universal category, we can make use of two simple and straight forward quotes. But since the category of the Other is nothing more than an idea, the hater has himself created what he hates.

It has created a category and it then imagines this category to be a facticity — to be the reason for the hatred. Therefore, the person who hates imagines that he can remove his hatred if he annihilates the people who are representative of the idea that he hates.

Hate is not a strategy to remove the idea that the hater hates. Rather, hatred is the free determination to pursue the death of the Other Sartre, But if the hater really killed who he hates, it would not change his hatred at all — it would not change the need for an object of hate.

The hater has reversed the relation of existence and essence in his strategy, which is why it fails. We can exemplify this misinterpretation through a concrete historical account. A years ago27 when we did not have colored immigrants, people hated the Swedish or the Germans.

Hatred gets its content through history, but its ontological roots are the conflicts of individual- and group identity.

If we were to remove immigrants altogether, the nationalists would need a new category to subscribe his hatred to. That might be people from Jutland if we suppose the haters to be from Copenhagen and so forth. Hatred is infinite in the sense that it is based on a will to possess moral value and not the real people that is being hated. People who want to possess moral value must always do so through the negation of Others.

The will to moral value is insatiable because positive moral value is deducted through negative moral value. That you remove what is given a negative moral value does not saturate the need for a negative moral value. On the contrary, the more negative value you can enter into someone that you hate, the more positive moral value it will give to you.

The hater presupposes the guilt of the person he hates because the idea of guilt is already included in his object of hate.

This idea represents everything which is wrong and it creates thereby an idea contrary to the object of hate - a category which is right; a category that the hater belongs to. Hatred is the will to a dualism of black and white - an easy world free of contradictions. But hatred is the division of the world into two antagonistic parts with negative and positive moral value. Thereby the hater has no need to differentiate between members of the perceived category.

Sartre, 29 Whether the subject of hate likes it or not, his essence is evil. Therefore, all that he does touches or is in relation to is evil. If I despise someone, he might be able to change the thing that I despise about him. But when I hate someone, I hate what is evil. The fact that I have projected evilness on him is the reason for my hate - not his actions. This might not sound so bad, but remember that the content of good and evil is arbitrary to the moral value itself. The more correct sentence would be that hatred is a will to create an essence in oneself, which is good and hence it constructs the negation of that essence as evil.

Therefore, when I hate, it is part of the goodness of my essence that I also hate intentionally. I not only hate something, but I also want to hate it. Whereas love becomes what is through a first order desire, hatred becomes what it is only through the second-order will.

This qualifies as love. My desire not to love you does not change that I love you. This statement is contradictory to the concept of hate.

An expression of this kind might be understood better as a representation of resentment, despise or disgust. This is because hate implies a positive second-order will to hate. Since hatred is a construction of the Other as an object, hatred happened to the subject of hate.

The hater subject uses his freedom to assert that the hatred happened rightfully. Whether the hater hates or not, it does not change that the subject of hate ought to be hated. This is contrary to love, because of the relation to morality.

If I wished not to love, it would be due to the fact that it is bad for me. But when I hate, it is because of an ideology that predicts that what is hated is bad for everyone — that the object of hate is evil. Hence, hatred is good because it fights evil. And not to fight evil is not bad for me — it is evil as well — it is bad for everyone.

For the hater, indifference would not be a bad attitude. It would be an evil attitude. For example, it might be suspected of being in liaison with the perceived evil. Sartre gives us an example of the hate30 of tomatoes as a contrast to the hate of Jews Sartre, 11 The individual knows that the hate of tomatoes does not arise from the qualities of the tomato itself.

One does for example not claim to hate gravel for the same reasons i. Rather, the individual knows that hatred arises from a particularity - a meeting with himself. From that point of departure, he might try to generalize that, by encourage other people not to eat tomatoes. But our concept of hatred is different.

Contrary to the foundational doctrine to existentialism hatred gives rise to a false belief of an essence that precedes existence.

Itinerary of a Thought

It presupposes that something must be wrong with the essence of the subject of hate. That the hater has come across it has nothing to do with it. Thereby, all responsibility has been put on the subject of hate. In our kind of hatred, it is beside the point who meets the subjects of hate. It is a categorical truth that applies for everyone. Thus, the hater can enjoy status as the defender of the greater good by acting hatefully towards subjects of hate. In the mind of the hater, he hates what is evil and evil is what is bad for everyone.

Really, it is the opposite. He wants to be good for everyone. He then creates himself as being a rival of evil.

Numéros en texte intégral

The moralization of the emotions of the hater is primary to his reasons for hating. Hence, it can be said that hatred is a pathology of the mind. My hateful attitude to you is different from other attitudes because the emotional content masks our relation as a relation between good and evil.

I would never think a tomato was evil - it is bad. But even if I can rationally appreciate that what subjects of hate do is not bad, they are still evil.

Final considerations This project has explicated the concept of hatred in the works of Jean-Paul Sartre. We have seen that hatred arises as a response to the relation between our pure consciousness and our ideas about who we are.

Since who we are, is a matter of our concrete relations to other people, a response to our inner conflict takes form as an attitude to other people. If our inner conflict is preoccupied with a fear of freedom to act against a desirable idea about who we are, we might apply hatred as a strategy to ascertain a reality in which we are inherently good regardless of our actions. Thus, the freedom is not a threat anymore.

This Sartrean account of hatred has thus shown us a concept of hate, which is pathological and which cannot be seen as a response to the material world. We have seen that hatred is infinite, moralizing, hostile to reasoning, a passionate and creative strategy to a desirable reality and that it ultimately is a denial of our true existence. This is of course a very peculiar concept of hatred, as it concerns only the hater - the subject of hate is only an arbitrary prisoner in a system of moral value.

But it is also a concept, which is capable of dealing with hatred in a way that is not only prudential. It can tell us why we hate something. Such a concept can give meaning to some contemporary problems of hate.

For example it can give meaning to the seemingly paradoxical hatred of hate. If hatred is to hate what is evil and evil is what is contrary to us, we can as the good and righteous hate those evil Others who hates. Their hate is different from ours. Another phenomenon that can shed light on the practical consequences of our concept of hate is groups of young pedophiles that have never committed atrocities and go to therapy in order to stay on a clean path.

Those who hate these immaculate pedophiles are in no sense reacting to anything wrong.This is nothing more than "constitution d'une forme sur un fond" Sartre The fact that I have projected evilness on him is the reason for my hate - not his actions. This attitude moves towards sadism. In other word, I can choose to pretend that I am a product of a fixed world around me or that I have a fixed essence regardless of how a free world makes me react. At its extreme, the alienation can become so intense that due to the guilt of being so radically enslaved by "the look" and therefore radically missing their own freedoms, the participants can experience masochistic and sadistic attitudes.

This system is often mistakenly called "love", but it is, in fact, nothing more than emotional alienation and denial of freedom through conflict with the other.

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